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Abstract. We analyze from a global point of view the expressive re-
sources of IF logic that do not stem from Henkin (partially-ordered)
quantification. When one restricts attention to regular IF sentences, this
amounts to the study of the fragment of IF logic which is individuated
by the game-theoretical property of Action Recall. We prove that the
fragment of Action Recall can express all existential second-order (ESO)
properties. This can be accomplished already by the prenex fragment
of Action Recall, whose only second-order source of expressiveness are
the so-called signalling patterns. The proof shows that a complete set of
Henkin prefixes is explicitly definable in the fragment of Action Recall.
In the more general case, in which also irregular IF sentences are allowed,
we show that full ESO expressive power can be achieved using neither
Henkin nor signalling patterns.
1 Introduction
Independence-Friendly logic ([10], [15]) is one of a number of formalisms that
have been developed in order to make various notions of dependence and inde-
pendence accessible to the instruments of logical investigation. Independence-
Friendly (IF) logic and similar formalisms (Dependence-Friendly logic, Depen-
dence logic [18]), in particular, were developed as a more flexible approach to
the logic of Henkin quantifiers ([9]). The Henkin quantifier Hnk is a matrix∀x
1
1 ∀x21 . . . ∀xn1 ∃y1
...
...
. . .
...
...
∀x1k ∀x2k . . . ∀xnk ∃yk

which, differently from a linear sequence of the same quantifiers, is meant to
state that each yi is supposed to be chosen as a function of x
1
i , . . . , x
n
i only. In IF
logic, the same is achieved by means of a linear prefix, together with a slashing
device. For example, the Henkin quantifier H12 is expressed in IF logic by the
sequence of quantifiers
∀x11∃y1∀x12(∃y2/{x11, y1}).
The slashed quantifier (∃y2/{x11, y1}) expresses the fact that y2 is independent
from x11 and y1.
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It has been gradually realized that, in spite of the fact that it stems from the
study of Henkin quantifiers, IF logic derives its expressiveness also from other
sources. Henkin quantifiers are partial orderings of first-order quantifiers; but in
IF logic also intransitive (thus not ordered) dependence sequences are allowed,
for example
∀x∃y(∃z/{x}).
Here y depends on x, z depends on y, but z does not depend on x. It is known
that such quantifier sequences, also known as signalling sequences (or patterns)
can be used to express higher-order concepts ([7],[4],[17]); for example, the IF
sentence ∃v∀x∃y(∃z/{x})(x = z ∧ y 6= v) is known to characterize the class of
all infinite structures (this idea is attributed, in [7], to Fred Galvin).
Henkin and signalling patterns are known to exhaust the higher-order expres-
sive power of prenex regular3 IF logic: if a regular sentence is in prenex normal
form and does not contain Henkin or signalling patterns, then it is equivalent to
some first-order sentence ([17]). Non-prenex, regular IF logic is known to contain
further expressive synctactical patterns (involving the interaction of quantifiers
and disjunctions) that are neither of the Henkin nor the signalling type, yet al-
low describing NP-complete problems such as SAT and SET PARTITIONING
([2]); the problem of a complete classification of such patterns is still open. Less
is known of irregular IF logic, which will be addressed here in Section 5. The
aim of the present paper is a better understanding of the resources of IF logic
that do not stem from Henkin quantification.
A peculiarity of Independence-Friendly logic is the close link between its
syntax and the theory of extensive games of imperfect information. The link
is given by the so-called Game-Theoretical Semantics, that we will review in
Section 2. Through this connection, game-theoretical concepts throw light on
peculiarities of the logic; and vice versa, the study of logical phenomena can
cast new light on the foundations of game theory.
It is well known, through the works of Henkin, Hintikka and others, that it is
possible to define a notion of truth for first-order languages in terms of certain
games of perfect information, which involve two players called Verifier (“Eloise”)
and Falsifier (“Abelard”), who take it in turns to point out evidence for or against
the truth of a given sentence ϕ in a given structure M . The resulting Game-
Theoretical Semantics (GTS) is equivalent to the usual Tarskian one.
When moving from first-order to IF languages, extending the Tarskian se-
mantics is not straightforward4; instead, it is quite natural to generalize the
semantic games by allowing imperfect information, in a way that the indepen-
dence constraints expressed by syntax correspond (roughly speaking) to the fact
that a player is forced to make his/her choices in ignorance of the outcomes of
some earlier moves ([10]). This generalization allows new complex possibilities.
Many IF games are actually games of imperfect recall : the players may forget
what they knew at earlier stages of the game.
3 The notion of regularity will be defined in Section 2.
4 It can be done, at the cost of defining a notion of satisfaction by sets of assignment,
instead of the usual single assignments. See e.g. [11],[12],[5],[18],[15].
In this paper, we will be particularly interested in a game-theoretical property
called action recall. Eloise has action recall if she cannot forget her own moves;
assuming regularity, an IF sentence has action recall (i.e., all its corresponding
games have action recall) for Eloise if its sets of slashed variables associated
to existential quantifiers contain no existentially quantified variables. Thus for
example ∀x(∃y/{x})R(x, y) has action recall, while ∃x(∃y/{x})R(x, y) does not.
The fragment of sentences with action recall for Eloise is particularly im-
portant, because, in it, it is impossible to write the usual IF translations of
Henkin prefixes5, and yet, it is a highly expressive fragment. Therefore, it is nat-
ural to wonder to what degree the IF-definable concepts are expressible under
the restriction of action recall. IF logic is known to capture exactly existential
second-order (ESO) definable classes. In Section 4 we will show that the Henkin
prefixes Hn2 are explicitly definable in the prenex, regular fragment of action
recall (therefore, by means of signalling). The Hn2 prefixes, taken together, are
known to capture all ESO definable concepts ([14]); therefore, the prenex, regular
fragment of action recall suffices for full IF expressive power.
When irregular IF sentences are allowed, instead, it becomes possible to vio-
late action recall in new ways; in Section 5 we use this fact to show, by means of a
translation procedure, that it is possible to express all IF properties using neither
Henkin nor signalling quantifier patterns. Section 2 reviews preliminary notions
about game-theoretical semantics and action recall, while Section 3 presents
some significant examples.
2 Preliminaries
Notation. Structures are denoted by capital italic letters. To keep the notation
simple, we do not introduce a separate symbol for the domain of a structure;
thus if M is a structure, a ∈ M and R ⊆ M2 mean that a is an element of the
domain of M and R is a binary relation on the domain of M , respectively.
An assignment of variables on a structure M is a function s : V →M , where
the domain V of s is a finite set of variables. We denote the set of all assignments
on M with domain V by As(V,M). Given an assignment s ∈ As(V,M) and an
element a ∈ M , we write s(a/v) for the assignment with domain V ∪ {v} such
that s(a/v)(v) = a and s(a/v)(u) = s(u) for u ∈ V \ {v}. If x = (x1, . . . , xn) is
a tuple of variables, we use the shorthand notation s(x) for (s(x1), . . . , s(xn)).
Game-Theoretical Semantics. The syntax of IF logic is a restriction of the
usual first-order syntax, to which we add quantifiers of the forms (∃v/V ) and
(∀v/V ), where V is a finite set of variables, called the slash set of the quantifier.
When V = ∅, we use the abbreviation Qx := (Qx/V ). The syntax is restricted,
with regards to usual first-order languages, in that
– we only allow the connectives ∧,∨ and ¬, and
– for simplicity, we only allow ¬ to occur in front of atomic formulae.
5 This point is exemplified by the IF rendition of the H12 prefix, shown above: its “slash
set” {x11, y1} contains an existentially quantified variable, y1.
The set Free(ϕ) of free variables of a formula ϕ is defined as usual, with the
proviso that also variables from slash sets can be either free or bound. For
example, in ∀x(∃y/{x, y, z})ψ, the occurrence of x in the slash set is bound,
while the occurrences of y, z are free.
A further restriction on the syntax of IF logic that is often assumed in the
literature (see, e.g., [3] and [15]) is that variables are not requantified:
– A sentence is regular if no quantifier (Qv/V ) occurs in the scope of another
quantifier (Q′v/W ) over the same variable v.
We denote IF logic with this regularity restriction by IFr. We will mostly restrict
our studies to IFr, but in Section 5 we will also consider irregular sentences.
Game-Theoretical Semantics (GTS) associates to each triple (ϕ,M, s), where
ϕ is an IF formula, M is a structure, and s ∈ As(V,M) for a set V of variables
such that Free(ϕ) ⊆ V , a 2-player win-lose extensive game of imperfect infor-
mation G(ϕ,M, s). In case ϕ is a sentence and s = ∅, we simply write G(ϕ,M).
The two players, usually called Eloise and Abelard, can be thought of as trying
to verify, respectively falsify, the sentence ϕ on the structure M . Their moves
are triggered by the most external logical operator of ϕ:
– in G(ψ1 ∨ ψ2,M, s), Eloise chooses a disjunct ψi, and then G(ψi,M, s) is
played;
– in G(ψ1 ∧ ψ2,M, s), the same kind of move is performed by Abelard;
– in G((∃v/V )ψ,M, s), Eloise picks an element a ∈ M and then the game
G(ψ,M, s(a/v)) is played;
– in G((∀v/V )ψ,M, s) the same kind of move is performed by Abelard;
– in G(α,M, s), with α a literal (i.e., an atomic formula or the negation of an
atomic formula), the winner is decided: it is Eloise in case M, s |= α (in the
usual first-order sense), and Abelard otherwise.
Imperfect information manifests itself in that some histories of the game are
considered indistinguishable for the player who has the turn to move at the
end of them. If two histories h and h′ both end with the choice of a subgame
associated with the same occurrence of a subformula (Qv/V )ψ with assignments
sh, sh′ ∈ As(W,M) such that sh(w) = sh′(w) for every w ∈W \V , then h and h′
are indistinguishable for the player associated to (Qv/V ), and we write h ∼V h′.
A strategy for Eloise in game G(ϕ,M, s) is a function associating, to each
history ending in a subgame G((∃v/V )ψ,M, s′), an element a ∈ M ; and, to
every history ending in a subgame G(ψ1 ∨ψ2,M, s′), either ψ1 or ψ2. Strategies
for Abelard can be similarly defined.
A strategy of Eloise is winning if, playing according to it, Eloise wins, what-
ever moves Abelard makes. Winning strategies for Abelard are defined dually.
A strategy σ is uniform if, whenever two histories h, h′ are in its domain and
h ∼V h′ (for the only appropriate V ), then σ(h) = σ(h′).
With this game-theoretical apparatus, it is possible to define the notions of
truth and falsity for IF sentences as the existence of appropriate strategies:
M |= ϕ if Eloise has a uniform winning strategy in G(ϕ,M)
M |=− ϕ if Abelard has a uniform winning strategy in G(ϕ,M).
There is also a third possibility: it may happen that neither player has a uniform
winning strategy (consider, e.g., the sentence ∀x(∃y/{x})x=y). In that case, the
game and the truth value of the sentence on M are said to be undetermined. In
this paper, we only focus on the truth/nontruth distinction. Accordingly, we say
that a class K of structures is definable in IF, if there is an IF sentence ϕ such
that for all structures M , we have M ∈ K ⇔ M |= ϕ. As was already shown
in [10], IF logic has the same expressive power as existential second-order logic
ESO: a class of structures is definable in IF if and only if it is definable in ESO.
Signalling and Henkin patterns. We have been talking informally of Henkin
and signalling patterns of quantifiers. Exact definitions were given in [17]; We
extend these definitions for irregular sentences.
– Let (Qv/V ) and (Q′u/U) be quantifiers occurring in a prefix or in a sentence.
We use the following terminology:
• (Qv/V ) is in the effective scope of (Q′u/U), if (Qv/V ) is in the scope of
(Q′u/U), v 6= u, and there is no quantifier (Q′′u/W ) in the scope of (Q′u/U)
such that (Qv/V ) in the scope of (Q′′u/W ). We write (Qv/V ) ∈ Es(Q′u/U)
if this is the case.
• (Qv/V ) depends on (Q′u/U) if (Qv/V ) ∈ Es(Q′u/U) and u /∈ V .
– A signalling pattern in a sentence consists of three quantifiers (∀x/X), (∃y/Y ),
(∃z/Z) such that (∃z/Z) ∈ Es(∃y/Y ) ∩ Es(∀x/X), (∃y/Y ) ∈ Es(∀x/X) and
• (∃y/Y ) depends on (∀x/X);
• (∃z/Z) depends on (∃y/Y ), but not on (∀x/X).
– A Henkin pattern in a sentence consists of four quantifiers (∀x/X), (∃y/Y ),
(∀z/Z), (∃w/W ) such that we have (∃w/W ), (∀z/Z), (∃y/Y ) ∈ Es(∀x/X),
(∃w/W ) ∈ Es(∃y/Y ) ∩ Es(∀z/Z) and
• (∃y/Y ) depends on (∀x/X), but not on (∀z/Z);
• (∃w/W ) depends on (∀z/Z), but not on (∀x/X) or (∃y/Y ).
Note that the last condition holds only if the existentially quantified variable y
is in the slash set W . Also note that in the case of regular sentences, we may
simply talk about scopes instead of effective scopes in the definitions above.
Action recall fragment of IF logic. Even though many different games are
associated to each single sentence (one game for each sentence-structure pair),
some interesting properties of the games are characterized by synctactical prop-
erties of the associated sentences; they are invariants of the sentence alone. As a
consequence, such game-theoretical properties define associated fragments of IF
logic. In particular, in the literature ([13],[16],[15] sect. 6.4, [1]) there has been
some interest in properties that limit the ability of players to forget. Considering
for example the role of Eloise:
– Eloise has action recall if she cannot forget her own moves.
– Eloise has knowledge memory if she cannot forget what she knew at earlier
stages of the game.
– Eloise has perfect recall if she has both action recall and knowledge memory.
Under the assumption of regularity, each of these properties has been given
a syntactical characterization in the literature (see e.g., [15], [1]). For action
recall the characterization is as follows: Assume that ϕ is a regular IF sentence.
Then Eloise has action recall in the game G(ϕ,M, s) if and only if ϕ satisfies the
following restriction on slash sets:
(RS) If an existential quantifier (∃v/V ) occurs in the scope of another exis-
tential quantifier (∃u/U), then u /∈ V .
It should be noted that the condition (RS) does not guarantee action recall for
Eloise on irregular sentences. For example, the formula ∃x∃x∃y(x = y) violates
action recall: in her third move, Eloise forgets the value chosen in the first move,
because it has been overwritten by the second move.
We denote the fragment of IF consisting of all regular formulae that satisfy
(RS) by IFrAR(∃) (here AR(∃) stands for Action Recall for ∃loise). Note that it is
impossible to write a Henkin quantifier in IFrAR(∃); for this reason, the fragment
IFrAR(∃) will be one of the main objects of study in this paper. We will also be
interested in the set IFp,rAR(∃) of prenex sentences of IF
r
AR(∃).
The fragments of perfect recall and knowledge memory are relatively well-
understood; truth, in both of them, can only capture first-order concepts (for
the former fragment, the result was anticipated in [13], [16] and adequately
proved in [15]; the latter fragment was addressed in [1]). The regular action
recall fragment IFrAR(∃) is by far less understood; some examples in the literature
show that it is capable of expressing higher-order concepts, such as infinity over
the empty signature, and some NP-complete problems (see Section 3). But a
general understanding of its expressive power is lacking, and will be addressed
in the present paper.
3 Examples
The main result that will be proved in section 4 implies that any ESO concept
can be expressed by some regular, prenex action recall formula (therefore, by
means of signalling). However, the defining sentences provided by the theorem
are often unnecessarily complicated. We give here some examples of NP-complete
problems that can be expressed by relatively simple sentences of IFp,rAR(∃).
Example 1. In [17], it was shown that the EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS problem
can be defined by a IFp,rAR(∃) sentence. This problem consists in deciding, given a
set U of 3k elements and a family C of 3-element subsets of U , whether there is
a subfamily of C which is a partition of U . It is defined by the sentence
∀x∃y(∃z/x)(U(x)→ (K (y) ∧ E (x , z )))
on finite structures M of domain U ∪C (where U ∩C = ∅), such that UM = U ,
Card(KM ) = k and EM = {〈a,B〉 | a ∈ U ,B ∈ C , a ∈ B}. We wish to point out
that, if we restrict, w.l.o.g., the class of structures by the additional constraint
that KM ⊆ M \UM , then the condition above can be shown (see Appendix) to
be equivalent to an ESO sentence of prefix ∃f∀x:
ϕ∗ = ∃f∀x(U(x)→ (K (f (x )) ∧ E (x , f (f (x ))))).
∃f∀x is the simplest non-trivial prefix of functional ESO. The fact that it can
capture NP-complete problems was shown by Grandjean ([8]); he applied this
prefix to a conjunction of twenty-one clauses to define the HAMILTON PATH
problem.
Example 2. We consider another NP-complete problem, DOMINATING SET:
the problem of deciding, given an integer k and a graph G = (V,EG) as input,
whether there is a set D ⊆ V of vertices of size at most k such that for every
vertex x ∈ V : either x ∈ D or (y, x) ∈ EG for some y ∈ D. Assuming that the
intended structures encode k by an interpreted unary predicate PG of cardinality
k, the problem is described (see Appendix) by the IFp,rAR(∃) sentence
∀x∃z(∃y/{x})((E(y, x) ∨ y = x) ∧ P (z)).
This description is based on an analogous result for Dependence logic ([19]).
Example 3. Also the problem SAT is expressible by means of signalling. SAT is
stated as follows: given a propositional formula pi in conjunctive normal form,
is pi satisfiable? The problem can be modeled over structures M of signature
P,N,C, 0, 1, with 0M , 1M distinct constants; CM ⊆ M representing the set of
clauses; PM , NM ⊆ (M\CM )×CM , representing the fact that the first argument
occurs positively, respectively negatively, in the second argument. In this class
of structures, SAT is described (see Appendix) by the following IFp,rAR(∃) sentence:
∀x∃y(∃z/{x})(C(x)→ ((P (y, x) ∧ z = 1) ∨ (N(y, x) ∧ z = 0))).
Since this specific form of SAT is known to be NP-complete under quantifier-
free reductions ([6]), we could give an argument based on standard tools to
show that IFp,rAR(∃) captures NP. In principle, we could extend this argument to
show that an “infinite” version of SAT is complete for ESO under quantifier-free
reductions, and thus IFp,rAR(∃) captures ESO. However, we will prove this result in
the next section with a more direct argument.
4 Explicit definition of Henkin quantifiers by signalling
In this section we show that the prenex action recall fragment IFp,rAR(∃) has the
same expressive power as the full IF logic. In the proof of this result we exploit
the fact that existential second-order logic is captured by Henkin quantifiers with
two rows:
Theorem 1 ([14]). For any ESO sentence there is an equivalent sentence of
the form (∀x1 . . . ∀xn ∃u
∀y1 . . . ∀yn ∃v
)
ψ,
where ψ is a quantifier-free formula.
By this result, it suffices to prove that, for any n, any sentence that is obtained
by applying the Henkin quantifier Hn2 to a quantifier-free formula, is expressible
in IFp,rAR(∃). Since IF
p,r
AR(∃) is a fragment of IF, and IF is expressively equivalent to
ESO, it follows then that the expressive powers of all the three logics IFp,rAR(∃), IF
and ESO coincide.
Thus, we consider a sentence starting with the Henkin quantifier Hn2 ; let
ϕ :=
(∀x1 . . . ∀xn ∃u
∀y1 . . . ∀yn ∃v
)
ψ(x1, . . . , xn, u, y1, . . . , yn, v),
where ψ is a quantifier-free formula. In order to make the argument below more
transparent, we formulate the truth condition of ϕ in a slightly non-standard
way: M |= ϕ if and only if there are relations Fa, Fb ⊆Mn+1 such that
(a) (M,Fa) |= ∀z ∃wFa(z, w),
(b) (M,Fb) |= ∀z ∃wFb(z, w),
(c) (M,Fa, Fb) |= ∀x∀u∀y ∀v(¬Fa(x, u) ∨ ¬Fb(y, v) ∨ ψ(x, u, y, v)).
Here, and in the sequel, z denotes a tuple (z1, . . . , zn) of distinct variables; sim-
ilarly, x = (x1, . . . , xn) and y = (y1, . . . , yn).
We will now build a sentence θ of IFp,rAR(∃) that expresses the three conditions
above. The idea is to use the variables z and w for expressing conditions (a)
and (b), and the variables x, u, y and v for expressing (c). In addition we use
an “index variable” i that Abelard will use in the game G(θ,M) to separate
the conditions (a), (b) and (c) from each other, and another “index variable”
j that Eloise uses either to signal the value of i, or to choose a disjunct of the
quantifier-free part in (c).
To simplify the presentation, we assume first that the signature contains three
constants, a, b and c, and consider only structures in which they are interpreted
by distinct elements. In this case, the sentence θ is defined as follows:
θ := ∀x∀u∀y ∀v∀z ∀i (∃j/Z)(∃w/X) η,
where Z is the set {z1, . . . , zn}, X is the set {x1, . . . , xn, u, y1, . . . , yn, v, i} and
η is the following quantifier-free formula
(i = a→ j = a) (1)
∧ (i = b→ j = b) (2)
∧ (i = c ∧ z = x ∧ j = a→ w 6= u) (3)
∧ (i = c ∧ z = y ∧ j = b→ w 6= v) (4)
∧ (i = c ∧ j = c→ ψ(x, u, y, v)) (5)
∧ (i = c→ (j = a ∨ j = b ∨ j = c)) (6)
Lemma 1. Let M be a structure such that a 6= b 6= c 6= a, where a = aM ,
b = bM and c = cM . Then M |= ϕ if and only if M |= θ.
Proof. Assume first that M |= ϕ. Let Fa and Fb be relations satisfying the
conditions (a), (b) and (c). Without loss of generality, we can assume that Fa
and Fb are actually functions. We describe a winning strategy σ for Eloise in
the semantic game G(θ,M). In the first six moves of the game, Abelard chooses
interpretations for the variables x, u, y, v, z and i; let s be the assignment formed
during these moves. Then Eloise answers by choosing a value ds for the variable
j as follows:
– If s(i) = a, then Eloise sets ds = a,
– If s(i) = b, then Eloise sets ds = b,
– Assume then that s(i) = c. By condition (c), one of the following holds:
(i) s(u) 6= Fa(s(x)), (ii) s(v) 6= Fb(s(y)), or (iii) M, s |= ψ.
In case (i), Eloise sets ds = a; in case (ii), Eloise sets ds = b; in case (iii),
Eloise sets ds = c.
In the next move, Eloise chooses a value es for the variable w. If ds ∈ {a, b}, she
sets es = Fds(s(z)); in case ds = c, she chooses an arbitrary es ∈M .
Note that the choice of ds above does not depend on s(zl) for any l. Similarly,
the choice of es is independent of s(x1), . . . , s(xn), s(u), s(y1), . . . , s(yn), s(v) and
s(i). Thus, the strategy of Eloise described above is uniform. Furthermore, it is
straightforward to verify that Eloise has a winning strategy in G(η,M, s′), where
s′ = s(ds/j, es/w). Thus, we see that M |= θ.
Assume then for the other direction that M |= θ. Then, given any as-
signment s ∈ As(X ∪ Z,M), Eloise can choose values ds and es for the vari-
ables j and w such that ds does not depend on s(z), es does not depend on
s(xuyvi) (but may depend on ds), and Eloise has a winning strategy in the
game G(η,M, s(ds/j, es/w)).
We define now relations Fa, Fb ⊆Mn+1 as follows:
– Fa := {(s(z), es) | s ∈ As(X ∪ Z,M), ds = a},
– Fb := {(s(z), es) | s ∈ As(X ∪ Z,M), ds = b}.
It suffices to show that conditions (a), (b) and (c) hold for these relations. In
order to prove (a), let m = (m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ Mn, and consider an assignment
s ∈ As(X ∪ Z,M) such that s(z) = m and s(i) = a. Then, ds is necessarily
a, since otherwise Eloise would lose the game G(η,M, s(ds/j, es/w)) if Abelard
chooses the first conjunct i = a → j = a of η. Thus, by the definition above,
(m, es) ∈ Fa. Condition (b) is proved symmetrically by using conjunct (2) of η.
Note that since the choice of es depends only on s(z) and ds, we can assume
that the relations Fa and Fb are actually functions M
n →M .
To prove (c), let s0 be an assignment with domain X \ {i}. We need to show
that Fa(s0(x)) 6= s0(u), Fb(s0(y)) 6= s0(v) or M, s0 |= ψ. Let s be an extension
of s0 to domain X ∪ Z such that s(i) = c. Then necessarily ds ∈ {a, b, c}, since
otherwise Eloise would lose the game G(η,M, s(ds/j, es/w)) if Abelard chooses
the last conjunct (6) of η.
Assume first that ds = a. Since the choice of ds does not depend on s(z),
we have ds′ = ds = a, where s
′ = s(s(x)/z). Then by the definition of Fa,
we have es′ = Fa(s
′(z)) = Fa(s0(x)). On the other hand, it must be the
case that es′ 6= s′(u) = s0(u), since otherwise Eloise would lose the game
G(η,M, s′(ds′/j, es′/w)) if Abelard chooses conjunct (3) of η. Thus, we see that
Fa(s0(x)) 6= s0(u). In the case ds = b, we can prove in the same way that
Fb(s0(y)) 6= s0(v), by using conjunct (4) of η.
Assume finally, that ds = c. Then it follows immediately that M, s0 |= ψ.
This is because otherwise Eloise would lose the game G(η,M, s(ds/j, es/w)) if
Abelard chooses conjunct (5) of η. uunionsq
We will next eliminate the assumption of three constants with distinct in-
terpretations. On structures with at least two different elements, this is done
by replacing the quantifiers ∀i and (∃j/Z) in θ by the sequences ∀i∀i′∀i′′ and
(∃j/Z)(∃j′/Z)(∃j′′/Z), respectively. Furthermore, the subformulae i = a, i = b
and i = c of η are replaced by i = i′ ∧ i 6= i′′, i = i′′ ∧ i 6= i′ and i′ = i′′ ∧ i 6= i′,
and similarly for the subformulae j = a, j = b and j = c. Let θ′ be the formula
obtained from θ by performing these changes. By a straightforward modification
of the proof of Lemma 1, we see that M |= ϕ ⇔ M |= θ′ holds for all structures
M with at least two elements.
If M has only one element, then clearly M |= ϕ ⇔ M |= ∀x∀u∀y ∀v ψ.
Furthermore, the implication M |= ∀x∀u∀y ∀v ψ ⇒ M |= ϕ holds for all
structures. Thus, we see that ϕ is equivalent to θ∗ on all structures, where θ∗ is
obtained from θ′ by adding (in the end of the prefix) the sequence ∀x′ ∀u′∀y′ ∀v′
of universal quantifiers and the disjunct ψ(x′, u′, y′, v′) to the quantifier-free
part, for some fresh variables x′ = (x′1, . . . , x
′
n), y
′ = (y′1, . . . , y
′
n), u
′ and v′. This
completes the proof of the main result in this section:
Theorem 2. IFp,rAR(∃) has the same expressive power as ESO. In particular, any
class definable in IF is already definable in IFp,rAR(∃).
Note that the length of the IFrAR(∃) translation θ
∗ given in the proof of The-
orem 2 is only linear with respect to the length of the original Hn2 formula ϕ.
Another interesting observation that follows from the proof is that there is no hi-
erarchy of expressive power based on the number or length of signalling patterns:
the signalling pattern in θ∗ is independent of n.
5 No-Henkin, no-signalling irregular IF logic
In Section 4, we showed that all ESO properties can be defined by regular, prenex
IF sentences of action recall. Such sentences are of the signalling, but not of the
Henkin kind. We show now that, if the restrictions of regularity and prenex form
are abandoned, then all ESO properties can be expressed by IF sentences which
contain neither Henkin nor signalling patterns.
Eliminating Henkin and signalling sequences by requantification
In order to create a Henkin or a signalling pattern, we need to have two existential
quantifiers that have certain dependencies to each other. In order to eliminate
these patterns, we now attempt to replace existential quantifiers with universal
quantifiers that have essentially the same role in the semantic game. This can
be done by a simple trick if we allow requantification of variables.
Let ϕ be a regular IF formula and let y be a fresh variable. Suppose that
ϕ has a subformula of the form (∃x/V )ψ. Now (∃x/V )ψ is equivalent to the
irregular IF formula (∃y/V )∀x(x 6=y ∨ ∀y ψ). The truth of this equivalence can
be seen by the following game-theoretical reasoning: After the quantification for
(∃y/V ), Abelard has to choose the same value for x as Eloise chose for y, since
else he loses the game (when Eloise chooses the left disjunct). Hence we see that
Eloise can indirectly “force” Abelard to choose a value for x in any (V -uniform)
way she wishes. And since Abelard may then choose a new value for y, Eloise
cannot use its value for signalling later in the game.
By replacing (∃x/V )ψ with (∃y/V )∀x(x 6= y ∨ ∀y ψ) in the sentence ϕ, we
obtain an equivalent sentence ϕ∗. If the existential quantifier (∃x/V ) created
Henkin or signalling patterns in ϕ with some other quantifiers, these patterns
are broken, since x is not existentially quantified anymore in ϕ∗. The new ex-
istential quantifier (∃y/V ), that was introduced, cannot create any new Henkin
patterns since the fresh variable y is not in any slash set of ϕ∗ and (∃y/V ) has
no existential quantifiers in its effective scope.
By iterating this translation process to every existential quantifier in ϕ, we
obtain an equivalent formula ϕ′ which has no Henkin patterns. But ϕ′ has no
signalling patterns either, since no existential quantifier in ϕ′ is in the effective
scope of any other existential quantifier.
Theorem 3. Every IF sentence ϕ is equivalent to an irregular IF sentence ϕ′
that has neither Henkin nor signalling patterns.
Proof. Let ϕ be any IF-sentence. Let {x1, . . . , xk} be the set of (distinct) vari-
ables that are existentially quantified in ϕ. Let {y1, . . . , yk} be a set of distinct
variables that do not occur in ϕ. We define ϕ′ recursively as follows:
ϕ′ = ϕ, if ϕ is a literal
(ψ ∨ θ)′ = ψ′ ∨ θ′, (ψ ∧ θ)′ = ψ′ ∧ θ′
((∀x/V )ψ)′ = (∀x/V )ψ′
((∃xi/V )ψ)′ = (∃yi/V )∀xi(xi 6=yi ∨ ∀yiψ′).
By the observations that we did above, ϕ′ has neither Henkin nor signalling
patterns. Thus it suffices to show that M |= ϕ if and only if M |= ϕ′. This is
quite easy to see by the game-theoretical intuition that we gave above. We give
a formal proof for this equivalence in the appendix. uunionsq
Note that our translation above can be applied for any IF formula – including
non-prenex and irregular formulae. Furthermore, the translation increases the
length of a given formula only by a small constant for each existential quantifier
in it. If a sentence ϕ in a prenex form is translated to ϕ′ as above, the prenex form
is lost. However, ϕ′ is still “almost prenex” since only disjunctions with a literal
as the left disjunct are created within the quantifier prefix. See the following
example for explicitly expressing Henkin prefix H12 without using Henkin or
signalling patterns.
Example 4. Consider the IF sentence ∀x∃y∀z(∃w/{x, y})ψ, where ψ is quantifier
free, and suppose that y′ does not occur in ψ. By applying our translation
procedure to the most external occurrence of an existential quantifier, ∃y, we
obtain the formula ξ := ∀x∃y′∀y(y 6= y′ ∨ ∀y′∀z(∃w/{x, y})ψ). Note here that
there is no need to apply the translation procedure to the innermost existential
quantifier (∃w/{x, y}). What happens to the flow of information in ξ? In the
right disjunct, the variables y and y′ carry the same value; as a signal, y is
blocked by the slash set of ∃w and, as a signal, y′ is blocked by ∀y′; but the
value of y (equal to the value of y′) can still be used within ψ.
Action recall for irregular formulae
As we discussed after defining the restriction (RS), there are irregular formu-
lae which satisfy it, but for which Eloise does not have action recall in the
corresponding semantic game. We analyse here what would be the proper char-
acterization of the syntactical fragment of action recall for irregular formulae.
Let ϕ be an irregular IF sentence in which a variable x is quantified two
times. If x is first universally quantified, this requantification does not violate
action recall for Eloise, since the first value for x is chosen by Abelard. But if
x is first existentially quantified, then there is a play of the semantic game for
ϕ in which Eloise chooses the value for x and then forgets that value when x is
requantified, and thus she does not have action recall, supposing that Eloise has
as at least one action make in the game after x has been requantified.
By the observation above, the action recall fragment for Eloise for all (in-
cluding irregular) formulae, denoted by IFAR(∃), is obtained simply by requiring
the following condition in addition to (RS):
– No quantifier (Qx/V ) is in the scope of a quantifier (∃x/W ) such that a
formula of the form ψ ∨ θ or (∃y/U)ψ is in the scope of (Qx/V ).
6 Conclusions
We have shown that full IF (i.e., ESO) expressive power can be achieved, without
the use of Henkin prefixes, already within each of the two following fragments
of IF logic: 1) prenex, regular IF logic with action recall (IFrAR(∃)), and 2) non-
prenex, irregular IF logic without Henkin and signalling patterns. The proof of
the first result shows that the Hn2 Henkin prefixes are explicitly definable by
means of signalling prefixes with a constant number of signalling variables. Con-
sequently, there are no hierarchies based on the number or length of signalling
patterns in IFrAR(∃).
These results extend the analysis of the expressive resources of IF logic which
was initiated in [17] and [2], and they raise a number of questions to be further
investigated:
– Is it possible to capture ESO within IFrAR(∃) without the use of signalling?
Note that this is not possible for IFp,rAR(∃), since prenex, regular IF logic with-
out Henkin and signalling patterns collapses to first-order logic ([17]).
– When considering irregular prenex sentences, are there other sources of
second-order expressive power, besides Henkin and signalling patterns?
– Are there interesting hierarchies of signalling prefixes, e.g. based on the num-
ber of universal or existential quantifiers?
7 Appendix
Example 1, and the prefix ∃f∀x
By applying so-called Skolemization, we can translate any IF sentence ϕ to an
equivalent ESO sentence of the form ∃f1 . . . ∃fnψ, where ψ is a first order formula
that contains no existential quantifiers. (The functions fi here correspond to
Eloise’s “choice functions” for choosing values for the existentially quantified
variables in ϕ.) For more details on Skolemization, see [15].
By applying Skolemization to ∀x∃y(∃z/x)(U(x) → (K (y) ∧ E (x , z ))), we
obtain an equivalent ESO sentence ϕ := ∃h∃gψ, where
ψ := ∀x(U(x)→ (K (h(x )) ∧ E (x , g(h(x ))))).
A proof that this ESO sentence defines the problem EXACT COVER BY 3-
SETS on appropriate structures can be found in [17]. Instead, we prove here that,
if we restrict the class of adequate structures for the problem EXACT COVER
BY 3-SETS by the additional constraint KM ⊆ M \ UM , then ϕ captures the
same class of structures as
ϕ∗ := ∃f∀x(U(x)→ (K (f (x )) ∧ E (x , f (f (x ))))).
This, together with the arguments in [17], gives a new proof that the NP-
complete problem EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS is expressible by ϕ∗, that is, by
the quantifier prefix ∃f∀x. (Note that the additional constraint KM ⊆ M \UM
does not decrease the generality of the problem.)
In one direction, it is apparent that ϕ∗ logically implies ϕ. Suppose instead
that ϕ holds in an appropriate structure M . Let g, h : M →M be two functions
that satisfy ψ. Define
f(x) =
{
h(x) if x ∈ UM
g(x) if x ∈M \ UM
Then, for all a ∈ UM , we have f(a) = h(a) and so from h(a) ∈ KM we obtain
f(a) ∈ KM ; from our assumption that KM ⊆ M \ UM we get f(a) ∈M \ UM ;
so, g(h(a)) = g(f(a)) = f(f(a)); then, from the fact that (a, g(h(a))) ∈ EM we
deduce (a, f(f(a))) ∈ EM . Therefore M |= ϕ∗.
Example 2, DOMINATING SET
We need to prove that the DOMINATING SET problem is captured by the
sentence ∀x∃z(∃y/{x})((E(y, x) ∨ y = x) ∧ P (z)). By using Skolemization, it
suffices to prove this claim for the ESO sentence
ζ := ∃f∃g∀x((E(g(f(x)), x) ∨ g(f(x)) = x) ∧ P (f(x))).
Fix an integer k. Let G = (V,EG, PG) be any structure such that (V,EG)
is a graph, and such that PG = {d1, . . . , dk} is a subset of V of cardinality k.
Suppose first that G has a dominating set D of cardinality k. Enumerate D
as {c1, . . . , ck}. Since D is a dominating set, to each a ∈ V we can associate a
ba ∈ D such that either (ba, a) ∈ EG or ba = a. Now, define f : V → PG as
follows: if ba = ci, then set f(a) := di. Define g : V → V as follows: g(di) = ci;
for a ∈ V \PG, g(a) takes an arbitrary value. Note then that, by the definitions,
for every a ∈ V , g(f(a)) = ba. Therefore, (G, f, g) |= E(g(f(x)), x)∨g(f(x)) = x.
And the definition of f implies that (G, f, g) |= P (f(x)).
Suppose instead that G |= ζ. Then, there are functions f : V → PG and
g : V → V such that, for every a ∈ V , either (g(f(a)), a) ∈ EG or g(f(a)) = a.
Define D := g[PG] = {g(a) | a ∈ PG}. Clearly Card(D) ≤ Card(PG) = k, and
since g(f(a)) ∈ D for every a ∈ V , D is a dominating set.
Example 3, SAT by signalling
For proving that ∀x∃y(∃z/{x})(C(x)→ ((P (y, x) ∧ z = 1) ∨ (N(y, x) ∧ z = 0)))
captures SAT, we apply Skolemization again and prove the claim for the ESO
sentence ξ := ∃f∃gψ, where
ψ := ∀x(C(x)→((P (f(x), x) ∧ g(f(x)) = 1) ∨ (N(f(x), x) ∧ g(f(x)) = 0))).
Let M be an appropriate structure, and pi the propositional formula encoded
by it. Suppose first that M is a “yes” instance of SAT; then there is a truth
assignment T such that each clause c of pi contains a literal αc for which we have
T (αc) = 1. A literal αc can either be of the form pc or ¬pc, with pc a proposition
symbol. In the first case, we then have T (pc) = 1, while in the second T (pc) = 0.
Let f : M → M be the function that maps c to pc (define it arbitrarily on
elements that are not clauses); let g : M →M be defined by g(p) := T (p) if p is
a proposition symbol, and an arbitrary constant otherwise. With these f and g,
(M,f, g) |= ψ.
Vice versa, suppose M |= ξ. Let f, g be two functions that satisfy ψ. Let T be
a truth assignment such that T (p) = g(p) for all the proposition symbols in pi.
Now for any c ∈ CM , either (f(c), c) ∈ PM and g(f(c)) = 1, or (f(c), c) ∈ NM
and g(f(c)) = 0. In the former case f(c) is a proposition symbol occurring
positively in c, to which T assigns truth value 1. Similarly, in the second case
f(c) is a proposition symbol which occurs negatively in c, to which T assigns
truth value 0. These remarks show that T satisfies pi.
Theorem 3; a proof for the equivalence
We argue by using compositional so-called team semantics for IF logic. For the
definition of this semantics – and the notation and terminology that we use here
– refer to [15]. In the proof we also use the downwards closure property of IF
logic. That is, if M,X |= ϕ and Y ⊆ X, then M,Y |= ϕ.
Let µ be a subformula of ϕ and let X be a team for which dom(X) = Free(µ).
We show by the structural induction on ϕ that the following equivalence holds
for any team Y for which dom(Y ) = {y1, . . . , yk}:
M,X |= µ iff M,X × Y |= µ′, (?)
where X×Y := {s∪s′ | s ∈ X and s′ ∈ Y }. (Note that dom(X)∩dom(Y ) = ∅.)
– The case when µ is a literal holds trivially since then µ = µ′ and the values
of the variables yi in the team do not affect the truth of µ.
– The cases µ = ψ ∧ θ and µ = (∀xj/V )ψ are proven easily by just applying
the inductive hypothesis.
– Let µ = ψ ∨ θ. Suppose first that M,X |= ψ ∨ θ and let Y be team. Now
there are X1, X2 ⊆ X s.t. X1 ∪X2 = X, M,X1 |= ψ and M,X2 |= θ. By the
inductive hypothesis we have M,X1 × Y |= ψ′ and M,X2 × Y |= θ′. Since
X1×Y ∪X2×Y = X×Y , we have M,X×Y |= ψ′∨ θ′, i.e. M,X×Y |= µ′.
Suppose then that M,X ×Y |= µ′ for any Y . In particular M,X ×{r} |= µ′
for some singleton {r}. Now there are X1, X2 ⊆ X s.t. X1 ∪X2 = X, such
that M,X1 × {r} |= ψ′ and M,X1 × {r} |= θ′. By the inductive hypothesis
we have M,X1 |= ψ and M,X2 |= θ. Therefore M,X |= ψ∨θ, i.e. M,X |= µ.
– Let µ = (∃xj/V )ψ for some j ≤ k. Suppose first that M,X |= ϕ and let Y
be a team. Hence there is a V -uniform f : X →M s.t. M,X[f/xj ] |= ψ.
Let g : X × Y → M s.t. g(s) = f(s  dom(X)) for every s ∈ X × Y . We
define the teams X ′ := (X × Y )[g/yj ,M/xj ], X1 := {s ∈ X ′ | xj 6=yj} and
X2 := {s ∈ X ′ | xj =yj}. Now clearly X1 ∪X2 = X ′ and M,X1 |= xj 6=yj .
Since M,X2 |= xj =yj , by the definition of g it is quite easy to see that
X2[M/yj ] = (X[f/xj ])× (Y [M/yj ])
By the inductive hypothesis we have M, (X[f/xj ]) × (Y [M/yj ]) |= ψ′ and
therefore M,X2[M/yj ] |= ψ′. Furthermore we have M,X2 |= ∀yjψ′ and thus
M,X ′ |= xj 6= yj ∨ ∀yjψ′. Since f was V -uniform also g is V -uniform and
thus M,X × Y |= (∃yj/V )∀xj(xj 6=yj ∨ ∀yjψ′), i.e. M,X × Y |= µ′.
Suppose then that M,X ×Y |= µ′ for any Y . In particular M,X ×{r} |= µ′
for some singleton {r}. Now there is a V -uniform function g : X ×{r} →M
s.t. M,X ′ |= xj 6= yj ∨ ∀yjψ′, where X ′ = (X × {r})[g/yj ,M/xj ]. Hence
there are X1, X2 ⊆ X ′ such that M,X1 |= xj 6=yj and M,X2 |= ∀yjψ′. Let
Z := {s ∈ X ′ | s(xj) = s(yj)}. Since M,Y1 |= xj 6=yj we must have Z ⊆ X2.
Thus by downwards closure M,Z |= ∀yjψ′, i.e. M,Z[M/yj ] |= ψ′.
Let f : X → M be such that f(s) = g(s ∪ r). Since M,Z |= xj =yj , by the
definition of f it is quite easy to see that
(X[f/xj ])× {r} ⊆ Z[M/yj ].
Therefore, again by downwards closure, M, (X[f/xj ]) × {r} |= ψ′. By the
inductive hypothesis M,X[f/xj ] |= ψ. Since g was V -uniform also f is V -
uniform and thus we have M,X |= (∃xj/V )ψ, i.e. M,X |= µ.
By Theorem 5.2 of [3] the values of variables in a team cannot affect the truth
of an IF sentence. Therefore, when µ = ϕ and X = {∅}, the equivalence in the
proof of Theorem 3 follows from (?). This concludes the proof. uunionsq
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